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Abstract: This article excavates and analyses an early, feminist conversation
about law that emerged from foundational texts on Gender and Development
(GAD). Rather than starting from current, law-heavy GAD practices, it goes back-
wards to see what, if anything, some canonical texts published between 1970 and
1989 said about law. My aim is to offer an account of legally-relevant GAD
theorising written before the current consensus about law reform as a tool had
solidified, and – in so doing – to unsettle that consensus and identify some
intellectual inheritances that might offer us an alternative way forward.
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1 Introduction: Bumping into Legal Furniture
In 2014, after attending a World Bank Law and Development event in Washington
D.C., I had one of those ‘I’m not in Kansas anymore’ moments that are becoming
increasingly common to me in my middle age – moments where I realise that the
policy priorities and conceptual debates that I took for granted in Gender and
Development (GAD) studies have moved. I feel as if I am wandering around a bit
lost, bumping into furniture that didn’t used to be there. The precipitating bump
in 2014 was the realisation that lawyers were everywhere within GAD theories,
policies, and practices. When I first started academically researching GAD in the
late 1990s,1 it was largely populated by economists, sociologists, geographers,
and anthropologists: in this respect the subfield reflected the inter-disciplinary rag
bag of interests that clustered, in the UK at least, under the heading ‘development
studies.’ In recent years, however, lawyers, and law reform as a tool, have become
much more prominent within GAD orbits. To give just a few examples, in 2009 the
World Bank launched the Women Business and the Law database to identify laws
*Corresponding author: Kate Bedford, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham,
Birmingham, UK, E-mail: k.bedford@bham.ac.uk
1 Prior to this, I had been interested in gender and development in the context of work within
NGOs.
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and regulations that discriminate against women and harm their ability to partic-
ipate in development. In 2017, the focus of the Bank’s annual Law, Justice, and
Development week was on gender equality and women’s empowerment. One of
the opening plenary speakers for the week was Claudia Paz y Paz, the first female
Attorney General in Guatemala; she spoke about Violence against Women as a
key law and development concern. World Bank President Jim Yong Kim
responded to her speech by pledging that law and justice would permeate every
aspect of the Bank’s development efforts.2
Other organisations have also increased the attention given to the nexus
between law, gender, and development. For example, the International
Development Law Organisation (IDLO) – an inter-governmental body that focuses
on bolstering the rule of law as a development mechanism – has connected its
work with concerns about gender equality, including via participating in a recent
UN High Level Group on justice for women.3 It too identifies law as a key indicator
of GAD progress. Specifically, according to the IDLO’s senior gender team:
As we work towards the achievement of Agenda 2030, it is essential to recognize the
mutually reinforcing nature of SDG 5 on gender equality and women’s empowerment and
SDG 16 on the rule of law. The rule of law plays a critical part in the recognition and
implementation of women’s rights. There has been a wave of domestic violence legislation,
from only 1 in 1976 to 127 in 2016. In 2015, 125 sexual harassment and 52 martial rape laws
were recorded to be in place (Rea Abada Chiongson, Senior Gender Adviser, and Nupur
Prakash, Gender and Law Associate, writing on Gender and the Rule of Law, Synergies
Between Sustainable Development Goal 5 and 16).4
Whereas in this extract the IDLO counts the presence or absence of laws as
evidence of progress, elsewhere attention is given to questions of justiciability
and access to justice, including via informal systems (IDLO 2013; see also
UNDP, UNICEF and UN 2013). In short, law reform, and attention to imple-
mentation, are now understood – by a range of agencies – as necessary to
overcome discrimination such that development delivers benefits to women.
2 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2017/03/28/law-justice-and-development-week-
2017>, accessed August 23, 2019.
3 See Justice for Women: High-level Group report (2019), involving the IDLO alongside UN Women,
the World Bank, and the Taskforce on Justice. The Taskforce comprises ministers from Argentina,
the Netherlands, and Sierra Leone, and is part of the Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive
Societies initiative, supported by 18 countries and 18 international organizations working on
Sustainable Development Goal 16 (building more peaceful, just ad inclusive societies). March
2019, available at: <https://www.idlo.int/publications/justice-women-high-level-group-report>,
accessed August 23, 2019.
4 January 2017, available at: <https://www.idlo.int/news/highlights/gender-and-rule-law-syner
gies-between-sdg-5-and-16>, accessed August 23, 2019.
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As a result, lawyers are increasingly central to GAD debates, as they are to
development more generally.5
In this article I offer some critical distance on this present moment, by tracing
and analysing an early, feminist conversation about law that emerged from
foundational texts in the GAD subfield. Rather than starting from current, law-
heavy GAD practices, I go backwards to see what, if anything, some canonical
texts published between 1970 and 1989 said about law within GAD. Many interna-
tionally-oriented accounts of gender and law start in the early 1990s, as the turn
to human rights rhetoric and instruments gathered pace,6 and as the gendered
social was (re)discovered as developmental terrain in the post-Washington con-
sensus (Rittich 2006; Pistor et al. 2010). Seeking to build on this work, I trace an
earlier set of conversations. My aim is to offer an account of legally-relevant GAD
theorising written before the current consensus about law reform as a tool had
solidified, and – in so doing – to unsettle that consensus and identify some
intellectual inheritances that might offer us an alternative way forward.
To this end, in Section 2 I outline the ambivalent hopes I place in a re-
narration of GAD’s less legalistic past, an approach borrowed from Clare
Hemmings’ work in telling feminist stories differently. I subsequently use this
approach to revisit classic texts in the liberal, post-colonial, and Marxist GAD
traditions (Section 3–5). I conclude by drawing together the key insights about
law, gender, and development that emerge from this re-narration. These include,
most notably, keen awareness of the limits and risk of state-centric legal
reforms; of the role of law in (re)producing the gendered inequalities that are
foundational to global capitalist development; of the importance of illegality in
struggles for emancipation; and of the role of legal recognition in structuring,
and suturing, economic and kinship relations. While explicating these contribu-
tions, I also use them to take forward a distinctive approach to engaging
feminist thinkers from GAD’s recent past, one that welcomes authors and their
critical insights back without using them to feed blame narratives in the present.
5 Development theories and practices are littered with demands for rule of/by law, and lawyers
are playing crucial roles in a range of development agencies. In a key critique of the limits that a
legalistic lens places on reform horizons, for example, Ambreena Manji has argued that “land
reform has come in practice to mean land law reform” (Manji 2005, 170 original emphasis). See
also, inter alia, Falk et al. (2008), García et al. (2014), Humphreys (2010), Kennedy (2006),
Lizarazo-Rodriguez (2017), Pahuya (2011), Perry-Kessaris (2010), Tamanaha (2011), Tan (2018),
Trubeck and Santos (2006), Zumbansen and Buchanan (2013).
6 See e. g. the accounts of gender and international law offered by Buss and Manji (2005);
Chinkin et al. (2005); Engle (2005); Rochette (2005). See also Manuh (1995), discussed below.
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2 Ambivalent Inheritances and Potent Hauntings
Feminist scholars and activists have long critically analysed the effects of
lawyers, and faith in state law reform, on campaigns for gender equality.7
Carol Smart presciently warned feminists against the ‘siren call of law’ (1989,
160), and the positioning of lawyers as ‘technocrats of an unfolding Utopia’
(161), and there has subsequently been extensive critical conversation about the
role of international law within issue-based campaigns pursued by transnational
women’s movements, especially violence against women.8 Likewise there has
been a vibrant discussion about the potentials and pitfalls of legalistic framings
of human rights for gender justice.9 In short, those of us interested in a critical
conversation about gender, law, and development have an extensive transna-
tional archive of insights about gender and the law upon which to draw,
although not one explicitly organised under a development moniker.10
In parallel, although rarely in conversation, there has been sustained
attention paid within law and development (LAD) orbits to the contested role
of law in, or as, development.11 In its more interdisciplinary and critical for-
mulations, this work has moved beyond providing legal blueprints for eco-
nomic growth to explore law’s complex role in facilitating, obfuscating, and –
at times – contesting the dispossession, plunder, and violence that have been
central to development (Humphrey 2010; Mattei and Nader 2008; Pahuja 2011).
Authors have hereby highlighted law’s co-constitutive role in the social, eco-
nomic, and political relations central to (mal)development, such that law
7 E. g. see, from very different perspectives, Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000), Conaghan
(2014), Davies (2013), Engle Merry (2006), Musembi (2013), Manji (2010).
8 On trafficking see especially Bernstein (2012) and Kotisworan (2014); on violence see espe-
cially Ni Aoláin (2014) and Tapia Tapia (2018); on rape and international criminal law see Buss
(2011), Halley (2008), Nikolic-Ristanovic (2005).
9 E. g. Engle (2005), Engle Merry (2006), Musembi (2013).
10 The closest one comes to such a moniker is in the Women, Law and Development in Africa
(WILDAF) movement. As noted by Takyiwaah Manuh, WILDAF emerged in the early 1990s “as
the legal counter-part to the ‘women in development’ approach of development agencies,
governments and NGOs” (1995, 207). It involved local women lawyers working on “law reform,
the popularization of the law, legal literacy and paralegal training for women as a means of
“empowering” them to take control of their lives” (1995, 207). In an early critique the move-
ment, Manuh questioned WILDAF’s optimism about the power of modern (state) law to improve
women’s lives, and its related condemnation of customary law as the key site of women’s
oppression. Although much of this critique remains pertinent, I focus in this article on an
earlier, less lawyerly, set of feminist conversations about law within development.
11 See footnote 5.
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becomes an interesting story in its own right rather than mere tool. As Sol
Picciotto puts it: ‘To say that law mediates power does not mean that it is a
mere fig leaf for the “real” relationships of power which occur somewhere else;
on the contrary, it means that the exercise of power takes specific legalized
forms’ (Picciotto 2011: 449).12 In this light, several scholars have examined the
implications of the legalistic claiming of dominion over social and human
development, including by squeezing out broader framings of rights.13 As
David Kennedy has argued (2006), there is widespread hope that using law –
imagined as neutral or benevolent tool – might avoid confrontation with the
political and economic choices involved in development. Yet this notion – that
law can balance out political and economic interests – misunderstands law’s
relationship to politics, and economics (2006, 163). By contrast, rule of law
rhetoric is used to cement policy preferences, including privatization of public
services, and other measures to serve the interests of transnational private firms
and investors (Humphreys 2010).
While learning much from these accounts, I remain somewhat frustrated
by their lack of engagement with the aforementioned feminist work on law.
Although gender increasingly features as a topic within LAD conversation –
one often associated with the recent turn to social or human rights approaches
(e. g. Pahuya 2011, 175; Rittich 2006; Pistor et al. 2010) – few other critics of
LAD cite feminist legal theory, or substantively engage GAD scholarship.14 I
thus hope, via this piece, to prompt LAD thinkers into deeper engagement with
extant feminist debates about law, and its role in (mal)development. It is my
contention that feminist development thinkers have generated important
insights about legalized forms of power – ones that have been thus far over-
looked within LAD debates.
To make this argument, I intentionally sidestep the usual chronological fram-
ing of LAD debates, structured around waves, moments, or phases.15 While useful
in certain ways, one of the limitations of the moments approach is that it restricts
our analytic lens to the conversations being had by lawyers about law as a tool
within development. It thus tends to focus on instrumental, pragmatist, top-down,
policy-oriented, or technical debates about law, especially within US-based insti-
tutions. It tends to minimise more anthropological, critical, sociological work on
12 See also Alessandrini (2017), Marks (2003).
13 E. g. Meckled-Garcia and Cali (2005), Garcia, Klare and Williams (2014).
14 For exceptions see, inter alia, Alessandrani (2017), Buchanan and Pahuja (2002), Manji
(2010), Orford (2002), Pahuja (2000).
15 See e. g. Trubeck and Santos (2006), Kennedy (2006), Gupta (2017), Humphreys (2010).
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lawwithin development, including that on legal pluralism, on law and colonialism,
and – as I suggest below– onGAD. This is by nomeans a new critique. In 1982, legal
historian Martin Chanock noted that mainstream legal scholarship about Africa had
been hampered by an “instrumental agenda” focused on using law to meet “the
perceived needs of economic development” (53). Moreover, there was a tendency to
think about law “as a cultural achievement,” making it “difficult to analyse its
oppressive aspects and its use in gaining, defining and perpetuating positions of
power and advantage for some over others” (55). For Chanock, “law … is too
important to be left to lawyers” (1982, 52).
Seeking to take this insight seriously, I draw inspiration from work using a
more inter-disciplinary, multi-layered and co-constitutive lens on LAD (e. g. Tan
2018; Eslava 2015; Perry-Kessaris 2010). For example, in an exceptionally com-
prehensive and inter-disciplinary account of the LAD field, Liliana Lizarazo-
Rodriguez chose not to follow a sequential stages or waves approach, instead
emphasizing “simultaneity, cross-fertilization and dialogue, convergence and
divergence, and hidden connections between approaches” (Lizarazo-Rodriguez
2017, 761). I share both the interest in hidden connections, and the hope for
better dialogue, and I too find a US-centred notion of LAD waves of limited help
in that journey. While I could identify moments in which lawyers working for
development institutions addressed gender, they would be too limited a starting
point. Instead, I offer an account of what was being said about gender, develop-
ment and law before that address.
Another of my hopes is that legally-curious feminist development critics can
move past what Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, in her account of the growing attention to
international criminal law within campaigns to end Violence against Women,
calls the “lost in translation” critique (Aoláin 2014). In this, rather than theorise
or critically analyse the demand for more law within GAD, development scholars
and/or practitioners end up noting the implementation gap between law and
practice, and trying to reduce it, with ‘law plus’ measures that leave law itself,
and its role within uneven development and gender inequality, uninterrogated.
While law reform and associated ‘law plus’ measures may in certain cases be
pragmatically necessary to secure substantive change in women’s lives, if our
academic conversations are narrowly fixated on the implementation gap we tend
to see law as instrument, albeit one that needs to be augmented with other tools
to be most effective. Deeper understanding of law’s co-constitutive role in the
gendered social, economic and political relations central to development threat-
ens to be pulled off course by the LAD policy audience (Sarat and Silbey 1988).16
16 Hence, to clarify, I do not intend to make an argument about the merits of turning to the
state, tout court, for redress within feminist political economy. I am interested in better
6 K. Bedford Law and Development Review
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To avoid that pull, the paper draws on the approach to narrating feminist
pasts offered by Clare Hemmings (2011), of how we collectively learn, craft, and
pass on stories about feminism, as social movement and intellectual canon.
Hemmings understands her task as to intervene in dominant Western feminist
stories of progress, loss, or return, to (re)align their political grammar so as to
allow for different visions of feminist pasts, presents, and futures (2011, 1).
Noting her own ambivalent impulse towards, on the one hand, offering correc-
tive accounts that promise a truer feminist story, and, on the other, wanting to
explore “how we might tell stories differently” (16; see also 23), she suggests that
we force absent presences back into our stories of feminism, to bring the ‘half-
forgotten’ back into conscious theoretical consideration (23). This process, one
she terms recitation, involves revisiting material previously encountered, as part
of an effort at ‘unforgetting’ (180), of making visible what is already there, of
inquiring after the ‘obscured dimensions of the present’ (181).
Hemmings’ project has much in common with efforts to disrupt interna-
tional law’s founding myths, including by re-narrating its colonial origins and
founding violence (Anghie 2005; Pahuya 2011; Orford 2006; Buchanan and
Johnson 2005; Tzouvala 2019), and critically interrogating its stories, or perform-
ances, of civilization and savagery, romance and tragedy, for what they enable
in the present (Koskenniemi 2005; Marks 2012; Humphreys 2010).17 However,
Hemmings’ approach to recitation is somewhat different to the methodology of
misreading, or reading against the grain, which subjects texts to analyses that
cut across the likely intentions of its authors (see, for example, Buchanan and
Johnson 2005). The most powerful example, in my view, is her reading of Judith
understanding the overwhelmingly legalistic nature of that turn to redress within current GAD
theory and practice. I thank Shirin Rai for prompting this clarification.
17 See, for example, Marks’ (2012) account of international law as romance, or tragedy –
different ‘modes of emplotment’ (309) that shape international affairs. On gender, see Anne
Orford’s blunt account of feminist legal theory’s niche role within mainstream international law:
for Rich World women to gain access to the stories of victimised Third World Women, and
design rules that protect or save them within the realm of international human rights or
criminal law (2002, 278–81). Thérèse Murphy uses this framework to help explain the ‘burgeon-
ing allure of the international’ in feminist legal scholarship and practice (2005, 79). Likewise see
Buss and Manji’s account of the need to interrogate the stories that we tell about law, and that
law tells about itself (2005, 15–16). Their collection contains several efforts at reinscription,
especially Buchanan and Johnson’s (2005) attempt to intervene in the dominant gendered and
racialized account of international law as saviour by reading the film ‘Unforgiven’ as a
jurisprudential text, and Manji’s (2005) re-reading of Ayi Kwei Armah’s novel ‘The Beautyful
Ones’ for the lessons it offers to law and development.
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Butler’s Gender Trouble through its association with Monique Wittig, rather than
Michel Foucault. Wittig is engaged as substantively by Butler as Foucault is, yet
feminist theorists commenting on Gender Trouble tend to reference Butler’s
association with him, not her. Wittig haunts our collective discussions of the
text, obscured but unquestionably there, a ‘potent haunting’, not an ‘arbitrary’
author or one sidelined by Butler herself (182).18 Motivated by a desire to move
beyond lamenting loss, Hemmings understands her mission as follows: “Instead
of asking, “where has Wittig gone?”, instead of remaining frustrated by her
absence, I want to ask what happens when we invite Wittig back, what joys and
unremembered sorrows resurface when we bring her out of the shadows and
into the spotlight?” (180).
In this article I ask that same question of feminist, critical approaches to
law within GAD.19 Instead of lamenting where they went, or blaming current
GAD practitioners for ignoring them, or advocating a return to them, here I
simply invite them back, to reencounter the joys and sorrows of earlier
encounters with law as a step on a path towards different, explicitly feminist
conversations about LAD. To that end, in the remainder of this article I revisit
three parts of the early canon of literature on GAD (the liberal approach of
Ester Boserup, the DAWN manifesto for development alternatives that fore-
grounded the needs of poor women in the Third World, and the Marxist
feminist approach of Marjorie Mbilinyi, Helen Safa, June Nash, Lourdes
Benería, Jane Parpart, Kathleen Staudt, and others) to see what lessons they
hold. Overall, I suggest that these texts reveal a shared understanding of law
as deeply co-constitutive of gendered capitalist development, such that – with
18 In a similar vein, see Orford’s discussion of how Western feminism is haunted by its
complicity with colonialism (2002, 275), and her analysis of Gayatri Spivak’s claim that efforts
to start something, or do something, with law are haunted (292).
19 I do this in part because I am interested in GAD, but I also concur with Hemmings that
gender and development is key to the (albeit circumscribed) legitimacy and power of gender
studies in many countries. As she notes, writing of her experience at the London School of
Economics, “In a UK context, gender studies is most likely to be institutionally supported
where it is harnessed to globalization and seen as producing future gender mainstreaming or
gender and development experts” (2011, 10–11). Because of this context – one from which
GAD academics have benefited – stories told about gender and development are central to
transnational feminist theory and practice. My hunch is that the place of law in those stories,
potentially, can tell us a lot about the place of law within broader narratives of global
feminism. See, further, Marjorie Mbilinyi’s account of women’s studies in the University of
Dar es Salaam, which began in a second year undergraduate course on women in develop-
ment (Mbilinyi 1985, 75).
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all due respect to Jim Yong Kim – law has long been seen by feminists as
permeating dominant development efforts, with overwhelmingly negative
effects on gender equality.
Staying in that place – one that welcomes back critical insights about law
without using them to feed blame narratives in the present – has been
uncomfortable at times. Like Hemmings, I am ambivalently positioned.
While I desire better, feminist stories about LAD, I also want very much for
GAD academics to stop telling our development stories in the same way. That
is, I want for us to stop pretending that we are innocent, that we were coopted,
or betrayed. For Hemmings, this is a key limit to generational narratives of
feminism (and, I’d suggest, of ‘waves’ approaches to LAD): that they “brin(g)
together affect and temporality to imagine the subject free of the complicity
others necessarily remain mired within” (2011, 83). Accountability and reflex-
ivity diminish when return fantasies flourish. Our collective complicity for the
current, law-heavy GAD landscape, as theorists, practitioners, and policy-
makers, will thus potentially be evaded. The lawyers will get blamed, as
they often do.
In a general sense, then, it behoves us all to be reflexive about our attach-
ments to the re-iteration of stories of loss, and potential redemption, that haunt
so much LAD theory, and that constitute one of the most significant risks in an
article of this kind. Corrective stories, and excavation of hitherto under-appre-
ciated critique, carry with them the promise that, thus corrected, law, and/or
development, will deliver us; they emerge revitalised, affectively recharged. I
want to interrupt that charge. In this regard, in the following pages I attempt to
use this recitation to gesture towards a different approach to engaging feminist
thinkers from GAD’s recent past, one that stays as close as possible to their
priorities and frameworks, and that injects an analytic pause before leaping to
apportion blame for why the conversation about law, gender, and development
has gone in other directions of late.
3 The Liberal Who Didn’t Think Much of Law:
Ester Boserup’s Women’s Role in Economic
Development (1970)
For those unfamiliar with her book, Ester Boserup was an agricultural economist
who worked at various points for the UN. Most notably, her 1970 book Women’s
Role in Economic Development helped galvanise attention that would in turn
Law, Gender, and Development 9
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help produce the first UN conference on women in Mexico City in 1975.20 The
book synthesised research – some from the UK’s colonial archives – about the
sexual division of labour in the developing world. The major claim was that
women were being deprived of their productive functions, in large part because
of the racialized and gendered stereotypes of Western development professio-
nals. Women’s status was being reduced as countries developed, and growth
was being retarded.
Boserup is sometimes read as if she is stirring women into modernization
theory, as a classic liberal thinker.21 Certainly she advocated that women inte-
grate into work in the modern economy, by which she meant scientifically-
guided agriculture, and participation in formal skilled trade. She lamented the
prejudices, discrimination, and poor training that prevented women from enter-
ing skilled employment, and she concluded that they mostly end up as ‘inferior’
workers (1970, 220) who contribute little to national production (even though
they work very hard). As I explicate in Section 5, she was thus soundly criticised
by Marxist feminists for failing to consider structural determinants of women’s
poverty, and for misunderstanding the social reproduction labour crucial to
capitalist development.
However by looking at what Boserup had to say about law, she doesn’t seem
so straightforwardly liberal after all. Firstly, she didn’t have that much to say
about law – that in itself isn’t very liberal. The word law, and lawyers, don’t
appear as an index heading, for example, whereas the word ‘anthropologists’
appears five times, as does the word ‘beer brewing.’ When discussing polygamy,
Boserup deprioritised formal family law and religious teachings that informed
customary law, arguing that practices are explained by economic factors and the
sexual division of labour (1970, 41).
That said, however, an in-depth reading of the book shows that Boserup did
not so much overlook law as put it in its place. To draw on Hemmings, law is
potent in the text: it was there, but it has been obscured. Specifically, Boserup
suggested 1. that we need to explore lower levels of law, including via a focus on
everyday manifestations of rights in practice, and 2. that the role of law in
gendered dispossession is crucial, and ongoing.
Firstly, Boserup focused on what we would now characterise as pluralist and
socio-legal analysis, focused on the grounded dimensions of multiple normative
20 It is important not to overstate Boserup’s role in this process. UN initiatives on women
were also heavily influenced by the work of women representatives from newly independ-
ent countries, many of whom had been active in liberation struggles. See Snyder and
Tadesse (1995).
21 See, for example, Bertolino (2006).
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orders in everyday life.22 Her table on ‘rights and duties of Yoruba women’
summarised what wives received from their husbands and what wives contributed
to the household (Table 1): it did not centre rights as a lawyer would understand
them. Her emphasis was on pluralist notions of social ordering, such that rights
were understood non-legalistically, and formal state law was not assumed to be a
key determinant of women’s status.
Moreover, unlike classic modernization thinkers, Boserup placed the respon-
sibility for the prejudices and discrimination that hamper women’s equal par-
ticipation largely on colonialism. For her,
European settlers, colonial administrators and technical advisors are largely responsible
for the deterioration in the status of women in the agricultural sectors of developing
countries. (1970, 53–4)
Legal restrictions played a key role in this status deterioration, such that
trading women were prevented from trading, farming women lost control
over their land, and brewing women were criminalised for offering their
services. The gendered exclusions and violence of law, especially in its
‘lowly’ forms of licenses and permits, hereby emerged as a key priority. For
example Boserup identified licensing and permit arrangements, wielded by
men, as crucial ‘weapons’ against female market traders, citing examples from
colonial-era Cameroon and Kenya of women – who dominated market trade –
being less likely to be given permits than men, leading to a spike in
Table 1: Rights and duties of Yoruba women.












Nothing   
Part of food   
All food     
Food, clothing and cash    
Total     
Percentage of Women with Rights and Duties.
Reproduced from Boserup 1970, 42.
22 See extensive discussion of such approaches in, inter alia, Manuh (1995) and von
BendaBeckmann et al. (2009).
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prosecutions of women for illegal hawking (94). Moreover, crucially she
extended beyond historical examples: she showed that modern agricultural
methods were often offered only to men, with extension services ignoring
women; some were “even ousted from their farms” (81). In this framing,
development involved legally-facilitated gendered dispossession. While none
of this will be news to historians of gender, law, and colonialism,23 it is notable
that such points were also made in what is widely regarded as the foundational
liberal text on the need to include women in development.
In summary, Boserup’s analysis decentred law as solution for women’s
subordination, while re-centring it as cause. Recitation of her book helps us
excavate a potent, and I think interesting, story about women, development,
and law, where even apparently liberal thinkers had a deeply materialist and
pluralist analysis of rights, and where formalism ceded to more constitutive,
critical, and socio-legal understandings that highlighted legally-facilitated vio-
lence, dispossession, and extraction. In this, Boserup had much in common with
subsequent, much more critical GAD analysts.
4 Law in Alternative Visions of Development that
Centred Poor Women’s Needs: DAWN and the
Uneven Potency of Law
In 1978, the US-based feminist quarterly Quest published a special issue on
International Feminism, including several reflections on the UN’s recent
efforts – partly inspired by Boserup – to integrate women into development.
One essay, on the 1976 International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women that
was held in Brussels, and involved 2000 women from 40 countries, centred
the limits of law in redressing violence against women. But it did not centre
development (Russell 1978).24 Another essay, by Nawal El Sadawi, Fatima
23 See e. g. Mbilinyi (1989), Manah (1995).
24 This early, feminist version of the people’s tribunal was an effort to gain recognition for
crimes against women at the international scale, but it was explicitly not oriented to securing
redress through law: it focused “on the crimes as personally experienced by women” (Russell
1978, 107) in order to raise awareness, between women, of their commonalities. For Diana
Russell (one of the organisers), the Brussels tribunal helped increase international feminist
solidarity, including by allowing women from the US to overcome their ‘rather parochial and
chauvinistic’ assumptions that they had more to teach than to learn (108). The international
feminist networks that were inspired and sustained by this sort of mobilising tended to focus on
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Mernissi and Mallica Vajarathon, provided a critical analysis of the 1976
Wellesley conference on Women In Development. But it did not discuss law
(critically or otherwise).25 The challenge facing those of us interested in what
was being said about law by feminist development critics is to bridge this
bifurcation, between those who focused on law’s role in facilitating and
then obfuscating violence against women, outwith discussions of develop-
ment and global capitalism, and those who centred development and capital-
ism but saw law as largely a side issue.
This challenge is brought into focus especially well by a key publication from
the collective Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era, or DAWN (Sen
and Grown 1987). The founding members of this collective were largely women’s
rights activists from developing countries. Academically speaking most were econ-
omists, sociologists, and anthropologists (see box 1). They were united by the
conviction that development as currently practiced was harming poor people
around the world, and that alternative economic approaches, focused on basic
needs, greater equality between and within nations, and environmental sustain-
ability, were required. Rather than work towards integrating women into “an
otherwise benevolent process of growth and development” (Sen 1987, 15), trans-
formative approaches were required to decentre growth, and to recentre poor
women’s needs. As they argued “equality with men who themselves suffered
unemployment, low wages, poor working conditions and racism within the existing
socioeconomic structures did not seem an adequate or worthy goal” (Sen 1987, 25).
Their struggle “is not an effort to play ‘catch up’ with the competitive, aggressive
‘dog-eat-dog’ spirit of the dominant system” (Sen 1987, 79); it is an effort to replace
that system.
violence against women (in some cases understood to include pornography – see Russell 1978).
They did not centre the issue of development, or political economy; rather, global sisterhood
was understood to be secured on the basis of shared experiences of male violence.
25 Attended by women from 30 countries, and intended as an opportunity to follow on from
debates about women’s role in development that emerged at the 1975 UN conference on women
in Mexico City, the Wellesley conference was the site for intense disagreement about the unity
and commonality of women. As El Sadawi, Mernissi and Vajarathon saw it, US academics who
believed themselves freed from sexism, as well as from colonial and imperialist limitations,
interpreted the condition of Third World Women, hereby echoing “the hardly-healed colonial
experience wherein the detached outsiders define your world to you” (1978, 102). The confer-
ence offered no analysis of how US women were affected by uneven development processes, no
central role for Third World Women as organisers, and no genuine dialogue.
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Box 1: DAWN’s founding members.
Zubeida Ahmad (Pakistan, ILO programme on rural women)
Neuma Figueredo de Aguiar (Brazil, sociologist)
Peggy Antrobus (Barbados, doctorate in education, and social work training
at University of Birmingham)
Lourdes Arizpe (Mexico, anthropologist)
Nirmala Banerjee (India, economist)
Carmen Barroso (Brazil, social psychology; focused on maternal health and
reproductive rights)
Ela Bhatt (India; trained as a lawyer; founder of Self-Employed Women’s
Association)
Tone Bleie (Norway; anthropologist)
Caren Grown (US; economist)
Hameeda Hossain (Bangladesh; PhD in history; work in human rights/
women’s rights)
Noleen Heyzer (Malaysia; social sciences)
Devaki Jain (India; economist)
Kumari Jayawardene (Sri Lanka; qualified as a barrister but PhD on labour
history)
Isabel Larguia (Argentinian who lived in Cuba; Marxist sociologist who later
worked on abortion rights)
Ragnhild Lund (Norway; development advisor)
Geertje Lycklama (Netherlands; sociologist)
Lucille Mair (Jamaica; historian)
Katharine McKee (USA; economist)
Fatima Mernissi (Morocco; political science/sociology)
Achola Pala Okeyo (Kenya, anthropologist)
Marie-Angelique Savane (Senegal; sociologist)
Gita Sen (India, economist)
Claire Slatter (Fiji; political science)
Like Boserup, these scholars were clear that law played a key role as cause of
women’s subordination. Unlike Boserup, however, they positioned women’s dis-
possession as part of a broader and on-going process of maldevelopment that
harmed colonised people across the world. For example, DAWN noted that
women had been stripped of their land rights under colonialism, but they located
this observation within an account of global capitalism whereby private property
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in land facilitated the extraction of resources and land revenues (Sen 1987, 30).
The legacies of this legally-facilitated plunder26 included a gendered and racial-
ised structure of radically unequal land ownership, and on-going subordination in
the world economy. As part of the structural adjustment processes being enacted
across the Third World, leading development institutions were advising countries
to continue to focus on primary exports, despite structurally unequal terms of
trade, and to open their economies to foreign capital, permitting extraction by
multi-national corporations. DAWN authors were clear that this approach to
development had particularly harmed poor women. For example, their status
had often declined with the introduction of cash crops, in part because women
relied more on common land and water to meet survival needs. Hence the
dispossession and enclosures that were part of the transition to a market economy
had gendered and racialised impacts. Moreover, in their discussion of militariza-
tion and violence, the collective linked the rise in military-controlled governments
suppressing internal dissent to the domestic unrest resulting from inequality,
poverty, and exploitation bred by development (Sen 1987, 72). Law featured in
their story firstly as dispossession, and then as repression.
DAWN was also sceptical about law as a solution to intersectional inequal-
ity. For example, in extensive discussions of land access and land reform,27 well-
intentioned legal changes premised on individual title were shown to further
disempower poor women. The collective discussed the Kano River project in
Northern Nigeria, which involved the registration of all land, and then its
reallocation to owners after irrigation infrastructure had been put in place
(42). The loss of communally-held land disproportionately affected women,
since the registered ‘senior owners’ were more likely to be men (42). DAWN
positioned the project as “a classic example of the argument that commercial-
ization based on unequal access to land and resources can be quite detrimental
to the living standards of the poor, especially women” (43).
Given this background, it is perhaps not surprising that law played a relatively
small role in DAWN’s vision of development alternatives. The book foregrounded
equality, justice, and dignity (20–1), but justice was framed in a broad, not legalistic
way, and contributors were far more vocal on basic needs than on rights. The key
place where rights appeared was in relation to reproductive health (46–9), where
reference was made to women’s legal and social status, and to the importance of
their individual autonomy (47): “Control over reproduction is a basic need and a
26 The term plunder is used – to great effect – by Mattei and Nader (2008) to undercut
mainstream claims that the role of law in development is beneficial.
27 E. g. in forms as diverse as subsistence food production, cattle grazing rights, access to
common land for fuel, water and food gathering.
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basic right for all women” (49). However the crucial next steps prioritised interna-
tional agencies and national health ministries establishing higher standards for
testing contraceptive devices and techniques so that Third World women’s health
was not put at risk (48). Law reform was not mentioned. In a similar vein, the
collective’s proposed solutions to violence against women were not about law, but
rather involved reducing inequality, and improving education (77).
Certainly, we can imagine a role for law as solution based on their other
commitments. For example, had their insistence that poor women were harmed
by commercialization in a context of structural inequality been heeded, legal
reforms to facilitate individual land titling, or microcredit, might not have been
regarded as such a widespread cure for gender inequality. Their emphasis on the
limits of liberal, equal treatment anti-discrimination arguments would suggest
an impatience with strategies privileging formal legal equality. This would
inevitably lead them beyond not only formal equality initiatives but also ‘law
plus’ measures that seek to ensure effective implementation of anti-discrimina-
tion, without tackling legally-enabled dispossession and repression.
However to pursue these themes would be to move beyond what DAWN said
about law to what they might have said had they taken it to be a more central
analytic category. We would need to venture past making visible what was
already there, or forcing an absent presence back into the narrative, to pursue
a fainter ghost of potentiality. Following that fainter ghost threatens to inflate
law’s role in the story of GAD, and thus I’m cautious about doing so. Suffice to
say that DAWN had a lot to say about law’s role as cause of women’s subordi-
nation, and relatively little interest in law reform as solution.
5 Marxist-Feminist Accounts
The DAWN conversation about GAD was enmeshed with another set of critical
debates, stemming from a more explicitly Marxist feminist tradition. In fact some
of the same people (notably Gita Sen and Noleen Heyzer) were leading figures in
both conversations. To analytically separate them thus risks severing DAWN’s
links to a Marxist feminist lineage, and implying that Marxist feminists were
uninterested in racialised global capitalism. And yet I separate them here. I
make this choice because I want to draw out some distinctive dimensions of the
Marxist feminist approach to LAD, ones that are less evident in the DAWN book
but that are elaborated in a number of other key collections. In particular,
Marxist feminists writing on development – in relation to both Latin America,
and Africa – not only echoed many of the claims found in the DAWN book about
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the key role of law in (re)producing the gender inequalities that are foundational
to capitalist development (Section 5.1), but they also highlighted distinctive
themes of illegality (Section 5.2), and the role of family law in women’s eco-
nomic subordination (Section 5.3). In this final part of the article I draw these
themes out, to foreground some insights about law’s role within GAD that were,
indisputably and potently, there in the 1970s and 1980s and that could arguably
be welcomed back in to our current work.
5.1 Capitalist Development, Gender, and Law: Over-arching
Lessons
As noted above, Boserup was soundly criticised by Marxist feminists for failing
to consider structural determinants of women’s poverty, and for misunderstand-
ing the social reproduction labour crucial to capitalist development. As econo-
mist Lourdes Benería explained in a 1982 collection on Women in Development:
The Sexual Division Of Labour in Rural Societies, while Boserup blamed gender-
biased modernization, fuelled by stereotypes, for women’s reduced status,
authors in the Marxist GAD tradition instead targeted the capitalist development
model. They foregrounded not prejudice, or the need to incorporate women into
the modern economy, but rather women’s structural subordination within global
processes of uneven development. As Marjorie Mbilinyi put it:
the whole thrust of “integrating women into the economic and civic life of the country” (e.
g. resolution 15, Declaration of Principles and Programme Action of the ILO Conference in
1976) is to deepen women’s vulnerability to oppression, domination and exploitation. For
women are already the most intensely exploited segment of the labour force in Africa, in
agriculture as well as manufacturing and services … The issue therefore is not one of
integrating women more into such exploitative and oppressive relations (Mbilinyi 1985, 77).
Similarly, as June Nash and Helen Safa noted in a path-breaking collection of
essays on development and women’s status in Latin America, their analytic
target was “the structure of the capitalist system” (1980, xi), and especially the
way in which it relied on exploitation of women’s labour in the household and
informal economy (see also Jelin 1980; Parpart and Staudt 1989, 6).
In this respect, Benería’s Women in Development collection included an
essay by Maria Mies, on how female lace makers in Narsapur, working from
their homes, were forced out of international trade networks through being
denied access to credit and modern technologies: “Women are not simply ‘left
behind’ while men monopolize the new and more profitable areas of the
economy; they are deliberately ‘defined back’ into the role of housewives”
Law, Gender, and Development 17
Brought to you by | provisional account
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 1/5/20 7:38 PM
(1982, 26). A similar framing was provided by Benería and Roldan’s account of
women’s industrial home-based work in Mexico City. They identified industrial
homework as “a form of capitalist production at the household level that
represents a disguised form of subproletarianization” (Benería and Roldan
1987, 165). Hence “it is not a question of two autonomous processes of labour
incorporation, that of the men in the proletariat and women in the subprole-
tariat” (103); rather the labour of wives and daughters facilitated the proletar-
ianization of spouses, sons and fathers, while also providing the key link
between the formal and informal sector of the economy. Similar accounts of
the key role of rural women’s labour in facilitating extractive development via
mines and plantations were provided by feminists studying Tanzania (Mbilinyi
1972, 1986, 1988); Kenya (Hay 1982); and Rhodesia (Lovett 1989).
The key question for my current purposes is what role – if any – law played
in this Marxist feminist reconceptualisation of GAD. On one level, many authors
echoed Boserup and DAWN in de-centring the relevance of formal legal equality
to most poor women’s lives. Jane Parpart and Kathleen Staudt noted that African
state discourse often limited feminist agendas “to manageable legal reforms”
that affected limited social change (Parpart and Staudt 1989, 11). Law was
generally de-emphasized in the Safa and Nash collection (1980) on Latin
America, receiving significantly less attention as a causal driver of women’s
subordination than economic relations in general. Maria del Carmen Elu de
Lenero’s list of the variables affecting women’s fertility did not include law.
Gloria Gonzalez Salazar’s analysis of Mexican women’s labour force participa-
tion noted that “Mexico has practically achieved juridical equality for women”
(1980, 184), in that civil, educational, social and political rights were formally
assured. Yet discrimination persisted. Gita Sen’s account of women’s experien-
ces within India’s Green Revolution also de-emphasised formal law as an
explanatory factor. Resting on faith in new technologies to increase yields, the
Green Revolution increased concentration of land ownership, and drew farmers
into the cash economy, with generally negative impacts on women’s status.
Many moved into seasonal causal labour – a highly exploited sector – to earn
money (1982, 40). While on paper land reform in some regions seemed to result
in increased levels of female ownership, in practice land title had been parcelled
out to family members to evade limits on landholding intended to break the
power of large landlords: women rarely had effective control of the land that
was nominally held in their name (47).
While these scholars noted implementation gaps, for others access to the
status afforded by formal legal recognition was a privilege enjoyed by elite
women, such that the turn to law as a solution functioned as a marker of
privilege. As Safa and Nash noted, the framed wedding picture is “a necessary
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part of the furniture” in upper and middle class homes across Latin America, “a
sign to distinguish the legally married women from those with lower status, who
are more likely to be in common-law unions” (1980, 230). In Vivian Mota’s
account of elite women allied to the Trujillo regime in the Dominican
Republic, the focus on suffrage, access to higher levels of formal education,
and legal reforms to grant formal equality was “a panacea” (Mota 1980, 273),
distant and potentially distracting from the daily struggles of poor women.
While arguing that early twentieth century colonial courts in Lagos provided a
key avenue for women to bring marital disputes,28 Kristen Mann emphasised
that these fora were used by educated, Christian, elite women (1982, 151).
More typically, however, when law was found to be partly determinative of
women’s status it was as a component of women’s subordination rather than a
remedy for it. This is especially clear in African studies literature on the role of
colonial and customary law in (re)structuring gender relations. A key 1982
collection on African Women and the Law, bringing together historians and
legal anthropologists, included several essays that positioned ‘customary law’
(original punctuation) as “created by the political economy of colonial capital-
ism rather than as the essence of African local law which survived the colonial
incursion” (Hay and Wright 1982, vii). For example, Martin Chanock claimed
that, in a context of growing labour migration in Rhodesia, the declining author-
ity of older men over younger men, and women, was expressed as concern about
marital breakdown and sexual indiscipline that was then codified into ‘custom-
ary law.’ As he summarised:
law is a way of exercising power and the “customary law” was perhaps the most effective
way by which African men could exert power in the colonial polity. It is, therefore, through
the story of the penetration of the Western legal mode into African social systems that
some of the difficulties of women in colonial society can be understood (52).
Margot Lovett’s account of law, gender, and class formation noted that colonial
and ‘customary’ law in East Africa closed off avenues for women’s accumula-
tion, including through measures to end the renting out of rooms, and beer
brewing (Lovett 1989, 24; see also Mbilinyi, discussed below). Again lowly levels
of law were important; new building regulations in Nairobi, requiring use of
stone, made it harder for African women to own houses (24).
In an especially compelling feminist account of legally-facilitated disposses-
sion, Noleen Heyzer (who would go on to serve as head of the United Nations
Development Fund for Women – UNIFEM – and Under Secretary General for the
UN) analysed the role of law in turning Malay women from subsistence farmers
28 See also Merry 1982, on pluralist forms of dispute settlement in colonial Zambia.
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into heavily surveilled workers in Singapore’s industrial periphery. With the
civilian population forcibly resettled by the British military administration in
Malaysia as part of the struggle against independence, residents were issued
temporary occupational licenses that could be cancelled for any reason, turning
people into illegal squatters on land that they had been forced onto in the first
place. This key ‘push’ factor for migration met the ‘pull’ of the Singaporean
economy’s reliance on female migrants as a reserve army of labour. The accept-
ing state subsequently imposed strict limits on these women to prevent perma-
nent settlement: employers were required to conduct, and report, pregnancy
tests on female migrant workers, and pay the repatriation expenses of pregnant
workers. Work permit holders required Ministry of Labour approval to marry
Singaporeans, and – in return for a marriage license – had to sign a bond that
they would be sterilized after the birth of a second child: failure to sign meant
refusal of the marriage license, withdrawal of the work permit, and loss of
housing and medical benefits (1982, 186). Legislation also stopped women
changing jobs in pursuit of better wages and conditions: permit holders were
prevented from leaving a specified workplace for 3 years (1982, 191). In Heyzer’s
account, women’s subordination is secured by – in fact, reliant on – law: her
GAD story is one in which formal state rules, including in forms such as permits,
licenses, and bonds, play a key role. While Boseup also noted the importance of
registration and licensing as ‘weapons’ against women, from the Marxist-femi-
nist collections we see a particularly in-depth focus on this dimension of GAD.
5.2 (Il)legality and Development: A Gendered Account
In addition, Marxist feminists writing on development foregrounded two further,
and distinctive, themes. Firstly, they focused in considerable depth on the way
that women were pushed into realms of illegality that i. rendered them dispro-
portionately vulnerable to law’s violence, ii. enabled gendered and racialized
forms of capitalist accumulation, and iii. could – perhaps paradoxically – sustain
resistance. This three-fold framing is particularly clear in Marjorie Mbilinyi’s
research on women in Dar es Salaam (e. g., 1985, 1988, 1989). Her work traced
how legal measures, including administrative ones such as licensing and permits,
created certain people (e. g. prostitutes, beer brewers, and hawkers) as illegal, and
hence hyper-vulnerable. They were easy to exploit, including via low wages and
bribes, and they faced forcible resettlement from urban areas in times of high
unemployment (1989, 125). In a particularly trenchant analysis of the colonial
production of gendered and racialised illegality, she identified an alliance
between the colonial state and those it designated ‘the responsible natives, the
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educated men’ (1989, 118) to dispossess women brewers in the 1930s. The state
favoured a monopolistic authorised producer, and took over the market (previ-
ously run by women) within which native-brewed beer was sold.
While the above account was historical in nature, in other work Mbilinyi
analysed the contemporary relevance of brewing to Tanzanian development
debates. She noted that many liberal analysts blamed men “for boozing up
cash proceeds from crops,” overlooking
the power relations which sustain low prices for agricultural commodities, and the interna-
tional division of labour that binds women and men to the soil. (1985, 78–9)
Moreover, “in many areas women booze along with men, to the consternation of
middle class observers” (1985, 79). For the purposes of this article, her broader
point goes to the heart of debates about the role of law in GAD. Mbilinyi insisted
that illegal brewing was a key manifestation “of resistance and struggle among
peasant women” (1985, 79–80). Their refusal to stop brewing beer was an attempt
to avoid state, and male, control over a form of economic activity that had
awarded them some autonomy.29 This emphasis on resistance suggests that illegal
realms may be a site for poor women’s agency. Indeed the state effort to take over
the beer market in Dar es Salaam failed: there was a widespread boycott of the
authorised producer, and the colonial township authority was forced to revoke the
relevant bylaw and return the industry to the women brewers (1989, 122).
Focusing on peasant responses to structural adjustment initiatives in Zaire,
Catherine Newbury and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf offered another contemporary
account of the gendered dynamics of illegality and legality in developing coun-
tries. Women were prominent in protests against state efforts to market, transport,
and tax their products in the early 1980s (1989, 97). Centring ‘off the books’
activities, such as hawking, home brewing, digging gold, and smuggling,
Newbury and Grundfest Schoepf argued that the turn to the irregular, and often
illegal, economy was about both survival and resistance (101). Women engaging
in these activities were trying to resist ‘further pauperization’ (100) by maintaining
access to an independent income (1989, 102–3). While acknowledging the limits of
the strategy – not least because women end up in the most vulnerable, most
easily scapegoated, and least profitable end of the value chain – nonetheless they
insist that off the books activities reflect efforts by women to direct labour into
channels where they can have some control over what is produced (103).30
29 Processing crops such as maize and millet into homebrew beer increases their value, and
women retain those proceeds. See Mbilinyi (1985).
30 See also Tranberg Hansen’s (1989) essay on the black market in Zambia, in the same
collection on Women and the State in Africa.
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These African-focused examples can be linked to similar debates in Latin
America, where several Marxist feminist authors highlighted the risks run by
street vendors and door to door pedlars, prostitutes, and rum brewers (e. g. Safa
1980). The final essay in Safa and Nash’s collection, based on an interview with
Llanquitray, a young Mapuche farmer and political leader, offers a particularly
important account of the role of law, and legality, in dispossession and disen-
franchisement. Llanquitray’s grandfather had been defrauded by a wealthy land-
owner, and had wasted years “enmeshed in useless litigation” (Bunster 1980,
303), being tricked and lied to as he threw away family money in a fruitless quest
to achieve restitution through the courts. According to his granddaughter, his:
obsession with justice led him to ignore the cultivation of the land. He spent his time and
money on useless complaints before the Indian Tribunal, presenting demands that only
gathered dust in the archives of dishonest judges and lawyers (Bunster 1980, 305).
In part due to this experience of dispossession, she went to boarding school to
learn Spanish, to enable her to better defend her community, and she became
involved in community politics. She never forgot the key lesson instilled by her
grandfather’s experience: that state law was a tool of dispossession, and that
hopes invested in it would likely be dashed. Instead of turning to courts, she
helped organise land invasions, in an attempt to accelerate the reforms promised
under Allende’s government and to secure the restitution of stolen land. The
Mapuche used land invasions precisely because the law was ‘useless’ to securing
justice: as Llanquitary put it, an indigenous person stripped of their land can
spend decades pursuing their claim through the courts, and become destitute:
and he will never win his claim. Why? Because a poor person can not put himself before a
rich one. Impossible! Not even worth dreaming of. He realises that the laws which exist are
useless to him; they protect the powerful, because they were made by them to protect
themselves (311).
Even the restitution laws put before Congress by leftist parties between 1967 and
1972 would not provide justice, because they required proof of title in formal
legal terms.31 Mapuche knowledge about ownership, and dispossession, was
discounted. Hence:
The celebrated law which presently rules the country serves us not at all. And why doesn’t
it serve us? Because it was made by the rich, the same rich who took away our land. That is
the truth. (in Bunster 1980, 310)
31 See discussion of Allende’s Programa de la Unidad Popular in Winn and Kay (1974). Note
especially Allende’s conflicted response to land seizures.
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When Llanquitray became an advisor to the leftist minister of agriculture, on
land issues, she did so on the understanding that the Mapuche movement
needed to avoid reliance on the law to secure land. Illegality, stemming from
an intersectional account of how law dispossessed poor indigenous commun-
ities, was hereby made central to the struggle for equitable development.32
In a related vein, Benería and Roldan’s study of women’s work in Mexico
City identified gendered (dis)connections between the formal economy, and the
semi-legal and illegal realm of activities that typified subcontracted homework.
They analysed the chains of contracts and other legally-mediated relationships
that linked women working in their homes, or in the illegally-operating base-
ments of legitimate factories, to multinational firms selling electrical appliances.
As they noted, legal employment status was crucial to well-being. Formal work-
ers received a money wage that was established by contract and subject to
labour codes and standards; they were typically covered by minimum wage
laws, and they had access to social security, and protection against arbitrary
dismissal (1987, 77). Workers in the subproletariat received casual not protected
wages (and were often paid in part in non-cash forms, such as food/shelter) (77);
they had no contractual relationship with employers, no access to social security
benefits, and no protection from labour law: almost 90% of the women workers
in their study earned an income lower than the legal minimum wage (97). In
contrast to Boserup, who viewed informal work as a timelag problem that
modernization would eventually overcome, for Marxist feminists the system of
production was integrated such that the formal/informal economy distinction
obfuscated structural interdependence. That said, however, law played a key
role in making the distinction materially significant, and in articulating the
relationship between the realms. The largest drop in wages across the produc-
tion chain was when the product went underground (37): work was outsourced
because it could be done more cheaply when labour laws could be ignored. They
painted what they called a ‘gloomy’ picture (72) whereby efforts to enforce
existing labour laws would likely fail, both because they would be difficult to
enforce, and because if they were enforced women would lose their jobs, the
cost advantage of employing them hereby removed. Meanwhile workers were
prevented from collective action because their work was illegal, and it would in
32 By the time Sex and Class in Latin America was published, the coup against Allende’s
government had reversed the land reforms secured by this sort of extra-legal activism.
According to one study, Mapuche families kept only about 16% of the land recovered between
1962 and 1973. Much of the land was given back to local farming elites, or to corporations for
pine and eucalyptus plantations. See Martín Correa, Raúl Molina, and Nancy Yáñez, La reforma
agraria y las tierras Mapuches: Chile 1962–1975 (Santiago: LOM, 2005), cited in NACLA (2013).
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any case be hard for homeworkers to overcome strict union recognition laws to
gain visibility.
Part of what differentiates the accounts of law offered by Mbilinyi, Newbury
and Grundfest Schoepf, Heyzer, Llanquitray, and Benería and Roldan from those
provided by Boserup, and DAWN, is the somewhat more co-constitutive role given
to law in discussions of GAD. For these Marxist feminist scholars, law is mostly
instrument, used to maximise class, colonial, gendered, and/or racialized power.
However, they also analyse the distinctive nature of the power of law as law
within this nexus. Heyzer focuses on a multi-level account of law as instrument, in
which colonial, military, and national laws interpenetrate with local-level admin-
istrative and company rules to deliver a profoundly unjust, and thoroughly
legalised, outcome. Llanguitray critiques both the misplaced faith in law reform
to achieve justice, and the epistemologies and subjectivities that this faith helps to
produce. Her target is not just the false promise of restitution through law, but the
consequences of that promise for subsequent repertoires of collective action,
including for how social movements make claims about true ownership. To seek
law’s protection renders indigenous people more vulnerable to the dispossession
and violence – epistemic, and structural – that stems from its recognition. In turn,
those writing on women’s role within the irregular economy offered an analytic
framework wherein, to paraphrase Piciotto, law is more than a cloak for extra-
legal forms of power. Law’s power is implicated in – in fact central to – the
gendered constitution of the formal/informal economy boundary, such that the
intertwining of illegality and legality emerges as a theme. We hereby see law’s
role in gendered capitalism as entangled, and constitutive; the ‘gloominess’ of the
picture (Benería and Roldan 1987, 72) is in part about the bind of legality, and its
alternatives, within current capitalist development.
5.3 A Distinctive Account of Family Law
A second key feature of Marxist feminist work on development was the insight
that the subproletarianization of women as wives rested on law, such that family
law became an analytic target for scholars trying to understand the gendered
relationship between sectors of the economy. From this perspective, family law,
and legal mediation of kinship arrangements, became relevant to discussions of
capitalist development in a distinctive way.
Central to this reconceptualisation of the role of the family within develop-
ment was its historicisation. Hence several scholars traced the use of custom-
ary and colonial law to tie women to extended kin, and to husbands, in order
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to restrict their economic independence. Margaret Jean Hay’s study of colonial
Kenya found that the rise in inequalities, land fragmentation, male labour
migration, and rural impoverishment associated with colonial capitalism invi-
gorated efforts to restrict women’s independent access to property. ‘Customary’
law on marriage, inheritance, and separation was codified “to require that a
woman remain in a viable marriage in order to enjoy access to agricultural
land, livestock, and other forms of movable wealth, and to retain custody of
her children” (1982, 112; see also Chanock 1982). In some cases women’s ability
to travel outside rural areas was made dependent on a legal marriage certifi-
cate (Lovett 1989, 28–9). Mbilinyi’s research on ‘runaway wives’ in colonial
Tanganyika showed how unmarried women, or women who had left husbands,
were rounded up and forcibly sent ‘home’ to ‘their’ tribal areas, as part of
efforts to restrict female migration (Mbilinyi 1988, 2). Women’s attempts to run
away from rural areas not only undermined the power of male elders, but also
threatened the effectiveness of a migrant labour system that was dependent on
their subsistence production.
While the above accounts were historical, others were contemporary. For
example Mbilinyi also highlighted the relevance of family law to the Tanzanian
effort to become “a democratic socialist and developed nation” (1972, 57). The
Marriage Act (1971) involved an effort to correct women’s legally oppressed
status, giving rights of inheritance for widows, and requiring a first wife to
register consent before her husband could legally marry a second wife
(Mbilinyi 1972, 67). While acknowledging these reforms as necessary, Mbilinyi
noted that liberal notions of consent were scant use in situations of economic
dependence, where women had little real choice (Mbilinyi 1972, 68). Relatedly
there had been no discussion, in divorce cases, of how to legally account for
what women contributed to the family via their social reproduction labour. In a
variant of a wages-for-housework argument, she wrote:
Women’s work, like peasant subsistence production, is socially necessary but is not valued
in the market place. It would seem that some kind of compensation should be provided for
this. (Mbilinyi 1972, 68)
Susan Jacobs provided another example, from Zimbabwe, of state efforts to
direct women into families. In the early 1980s the new government introduced
several pieces of legislation with positive effects for women, including to equal-
ise the legal age of majority. However, it also launched a ‘clean up’ campaign
directed at urban prostitutes involving mass arrests. Some women were released
on production of a marriage certificate, while others were sent to resettlement
camps (Jacobs 1989, 168).
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In the 1982 collection on development edited by Benería, Zenebeworke
Tadesse33 – a sociologist who would later work for UNRISD and co-found the
Association of African Women for Research and Development – offered a partic-
ularly interesting cautionary tale about faith in law reform to improve women’s
status, this time from the perspective of a state engaged in an avowedly revolu-
tionary approach to law (1982).34 She considered the gendered impact of
Ethiopian land reforms that had abolished private ownership, collectivized
land holding, given possessionary rights to peasants, and created peasant
associations with judicial tribunals to adjudicate land disputes, in an effort to
undercut the power of corrupt judges. Tadesse documented the limits of these
measures. For example, the Land Reform Proclamation (1975) specified that a
personal cultivator of land (regardless of sex) should be allotted land, but the
assumption underpinning practice was that the husband, as head of the family,
was to be the recipient of plots; family members were to then allocated to work
them. Moreover the law rested on assumptions about monogamous families that
were out of step with kinship realities, harming women in polygamous house-
holds. Men would formally register one wife for purposes of land allocation,
leaving others without access to land (Tadesse 1982, 214). Tadesse hence con-
cluded with a suggestion that abolition of private land ownership must be joined
with an “an all out struggle against patriarchal authority” involving marriage
law reform to abolish the concept of household (217). In other words, genuinely
revolutionary law reform would tackle both private property and (hetero)norma-
tive forms of kinship: otherwise it would fail to secure transformation in wom-
en’s position.
This assertion – absent from Boserup’s work, and the DAWN discussions –
was far from unusual in Marxist feminist debates about development. To illus-
trate this, I wish to return briefly to the (1978) special issue of the feminist
journal Quest. Focused on international feminism, this was an early effort at
articulating the fault lines of global feminist theory. The issue contained an
essay by US academic Jane Flax, on the Cuban Family Code adopted in 1975.
(Flax is a feminist philosopher; she would later write on psychoanalysis). The
Code aimed to address women’s ‘second shift’ – their responsibility for unpaid
33 In other publications her name is spelt Zenebework, or abbreviated to Zen. See e. g. Tadesse
(1979).
34 Interestingly DAWN did not analyse socialist or communist attempts to reframe develop-
ment (see discussion on in Sen and Grown 1987, 25). Hence their accounts of law remain within
a capitalist framing. By contrast, the Marxist feminist conversations on which I draw in this
section include several analyses of the complex gendered impacts of avowedly revolutionary
laws, in contexts ranging from Cuba to China to Ethiopia.
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social reproduction labour alongside paid employment. Like Tadesse, Flax
assessed this key episode of avowedly revolutionary law reform from a socialist
feminist perspective, and she hereby raised fundamental questions about the
role of state law in gender relations. In part because it identified the family as
the ‘elementary cell’ of society and the centre for relations between men,
women, and children, for Flax “The Code raises rather than resolves one of
the most difficult issues for feminist theory: the role of the heterosexual family
and its place in a liberated society” (1978, 87). The Cuban state’s preference for
judicially recognised marriages reflected a ‘bias towards heterosexuality’ that
she found ‘extremely troubling’: “Can patriarchy be completely eliminated with-
out an attack on the channelling of sexuality in exclusively heterosexual direc-
tions?” (87). In a highly prescient insight – and again one that was relatively
common to Marxist feminist work – Flax noted “while we need means of
insuring responsibility between adults and between adults and children, it is
not clear that granting the state a monopoly on regulating and legitimating these
relations is the solution” (88).
Encountering this work – written before the Marxist government in Ethiopia
helped cause a famine, but when the Cuban state’s repression of homosexuality
was already known35 – is both unsettling, and instructive. The benefit of hind-
sight clearly unsettles the hope that Marxist law reform will deliver (gender)
justice. That said, however, Tadesse and Flax themselves questioned that hope:
both scholars claimed that state-centred approaches to revolution risked side-
stepping crucial debates about women’s sexual and economic autonomy. Their
work is hereby refreshingly disruptive to dominant accounts about how, and
when, sexuality emerged as a theme within development conversations.
Transnationally, conversations about sexuality within development have tended
to highlight the significance of reproductive rights, and/or HIV/AIDS.36 Here,
though, we see two socialist feminists, non-lawyers from the South and North
respectively, debating the role of family and land law in regulating heterosex-
uality in the context of capitalist development.
In addition, what stands out from these examples is their holistic, and heavily
critical, account of the role of law. Beyond privileging experiences of implemen-
tation over formal legislation; beyond highlighting the risk of legal reforms
35 In the late 1960s, the Cuban state targeted gay men for internment and ‘re-education’ in
forced labour camps. It also banned hiring gay people in jobs ‘where they could exert influence
over Cuban youth’ and a 1974 law “proscribed any ‘public ostentation’ of a homosexual identity
as offensive to socialist morality under the rubric of ‘peligrosidad social’ [‘social dangerous-
ness’]” (Guerra 2010, 269).
36 See, for example, the account in Oosterhoff and Sweetman (2018).
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distracting attention from women’s on-going subordination; beyond noting the
violence of law, and the importance of illegality in struggles for emancipation,
Marxist feminists foregrounded the role of legal recognition in structuring, and
suturing, the economic and kinship relations central to development. Specifically,
family law was understood to be a key mechanism by which women’s subordi-
nation was secured. It enabled the state to channel sexuality into normative forms
of the household, which – for Marxist feminists – had a key economic role. Put
more simply, family law was just not about patriarchy; it was also about capital-
ism. While this understanding can be faulted for its somewhat functionalist
account of law, what it brought into focus, uniquely, is the political economic
relevance of the legal architectures that help structure kinship.
6 Recitation Lessons, and Attachment Risks:
A Tentative Conclusion
To close, I wish to recap the insights that emerge from a revisiting of the place, and
role, of law in early texts on women and development. As indicated in Section 2,
the aim is not to triumphantly show that feminists ‘got there’ first, whether the
‘there’ in question is a thoughtful analysis of LAD in general, or illegality and
kinship regulation in particular. Neither is it to contrast past feminist theories about
law with current GAD practices; I lack the space to analyse those practices in any
substantive way here. Rather, I wish to use the opportunity provided by revisiting
these texts to simply, for now, welcome back what they say, and to critically
interrogate the ambivalent attachments they provoke, in me and, perhaps, in others
who have been involved in GAD for some time.
Most obviously, a welcoming back of this early work unsettles many dom-
inant accounts of waves, or moments, within the LAD field. It becomes clear that
gender, law, and development debates predate the turn to international human
rights, and the post-Washington consensus. We see that law has long been seen
by feminists as permeating dominant development efforts, with overwhelmingly
negative effects on women.
Relatedly, the act of revisiting such texts confirms the urgent need to
connect up law and development discussions to critical work on law emanating
from interdisciplinary GAD conversations. In the literatures discussed here, we
see feminist economists, social workers, sociologists, anthropologists, histori-
ans, political scientists, and education scholars all reflecting critically on law
and development. They did not organise their work under a ‘law and develop-
ment’ moniker, however; in fact, there is almost no reference in these works to
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what is now considered to be the law and development canon. Instead, these
authors clustered under academic headings of feminist state theory, women/
gender and development, African studies, and – crucially – Marxist feminism.
Hence we need to urgently revise our approach to canonical literatures in the
field if we are to effectively understand the range, and depth, of debates that
were being had about gender, law, and development in the 1970s and 1980s.
More specifically, from these texts we see that feminist authors from very
different intellectual and political traditions tended to share an interest in law’s
role as key cause of women’s dispossession and inequality, but show relatively
little enthusiasm for law reform as solution. Feminist work was also character-
ised by an interconnected, multilevel, and socio-legal approach to law. Legal
pluralism was taken for granted, even by liberals, such that reform to state law
was not assumed, apriori, to be the key lever for social change.
Moreover, when state law was discussed it was often understood to be
connected to other levels of law and regulation, at both the transnational level
(through the activities of development agencies and international financial
institutions), and the local level. In this regard, lower levels of law were central
to the conversation: town-level licenses and permits were far more important
than constitutional reforms.
The gendered production of illegality, and the relationship between law and
its others, was another central preoccupation. While liberals framed laws
restricting women’s movement, or economic activities, as evidence of prejudice,
others saw the role of ‘law as weapon’ differently: as also about capital accu-
mulation, and a narrowing of women’s claims-making on the state. From the
Marxist feminist texts in particular we see a wide, more-than-legal repertoire of
women’s collective action, whereby law is confronted head on with land inva-
sions, indigenous notions of property ownership, and illegal brewing. Political
economic claims and entitlements are mobilised outwith, not just through, law.
The critical edge of early feminist scholarship on law within development is
also manifest in the Marxist feminist account of family law. This tied together
analysis of kinship structures and political economy, to critique revolutionary
law reform initiatives for being insufficiently transformative. The problem with
family law was not merely that it discriminated against women, in a liberal
mode of understanding, but that it was tied to a capitalist mode of production
that involved the state channelling of sexuality, and unpaid social reproduction
labour, into the family form. Using this framing of the problem, feminists
critiqued both land reform efforts that ignored the family, and family law
reforms that failed to account for women’s role in social reproduction.
If we accept that a revisiting of early GAD texts produces these insights
about law, a subsequent question emerges: what is the point of articulating
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these insights now? Is it, as one colleague wondered, to provide a ‘gotcha’
moment, where I show that feminists arrived at many of the key critiques of
LAD first?37 Is it to upend dominant historiographies of LAD, to trace an alter-
native version wherein women’s voices are re-centered? Or is it, as Hemmings
would suggest, an opportunity to do something else as well, or instead – to
rethink our own investments in narratives of progress, or loss, or return, such
that we consciously try to tell the LAD story differently?
For me, one of the biggest risks in a recitation exercise like this is the inability
to manage my own ambivalent, somewhat grumpy, investment in corrective
accounts that promise a truer, redemptive, feminist story about LAD. The danger
is of indulging my wounded attachment to imagined loss, via a ‘return’ to a time
when GAD was a path to vibrant debate about global, critical, and feminist
political economy, rather than a highway to corporatized conferences about law
and business feminism. Were I to so indulge, I would end with a partly trium-
phant, partly sad, partly indignant summary of how our conversations about law
used to be so much more critical, and inter-disciplinary, and inter-sectional, than
they are now. I would ask what went wrong; why and how we got so limited in
our thinking that we instinctively count more laws as a sign of progress, in a way
that Ester Boserup would find deeply puzzling. And in some ways those are
crucial questions. They help us excavate a potent alternative story about GAD
and law, where even liberal thinkers had a deeply materialist and pluralist
analysis of rights, and legally-facilitated violence, dispossession, and extraction
were central concerns. I do very much wish that these concerns were more central
to current gender, law, and development conversation.
Yet the ambivalence remains, in part because I know the collective risks of
the return fantasy. Accountability and reflexivity diminish when return fantasies
flourish. In this regard, I have attempted to use the recitation to gesture towards
a different approach to engaging feminist thinkers from GAD’s recent past, one
that welcomes back critical insights about law without using them to immedi-
ately feed blame narratives in the present. There are vital questions left hanging
by the choice to inject such an analytic pause, not least about the fate of these
critical insights in the current rush to law-heavy solutions for gender inequality.
But they are best asked in subsequent articles. For now, I seek simply to re-cite
the work I have encountered, and underscore its potency, in an effort to bring
the ‘half-forgotten’ (Hemmings 2011, 23) back into our debates on law, gender,
and development. Such unforgetting provokes a complex mix of joys and
37 Sonia Lawrence asked me this question in 2017, after encountering an early version of this
paper.
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sorrows, but, more straightforwardly, it also confirms the need to broaden our
stories of the LAD subfield to include interdisciplinary feminist scholarship.
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